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Every airline union claims to work for safety and presents anecdotes where 
greater airline safety has been achieved through union efforts. The effect unionization has 
on safety outcomes in U.S. commercial airlines, however, wasn’t found to be previously 
tested. Studies have shown that in industries such as coal mining, retail, and construction, 
unionization does lead to an increase in safety. This study evaluated the safety rates of 15 
major US commercial airlines to compare the difference between unionized and non-
unionized airlines.  These safety rates were compared based on if and how long each 
airline’s pilots and flight attendants have been unionized, to determine if unionization had 
an effect on safety outcomes. The 15 airlines included in the study identified as operating 
most of the years between 1990 and 2013, with annual departures averaging over 
130,000, available through the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Accident and Incident 
information was acquired through the National Transportation Safety Board database. 
The number of accident and incidents divided by the total departures at each airline was 
used as the safety rate. Union websites provided information on unionization at the 
airlines. Due to the complex nature of the aviation industry, a number of confounding 
factors could have affected the tests, including mergers, route structures, and legislation. 
To help control for these confounding factors, this study was limited to airlines with a 
stable presence in the industry over time, which limited the number of airlines included. 
No significant difference was found between unionized and non-unionized airlines in this 
study, though the mean safety rate of unionized airlines was found be better than non-
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unionized airlines. This study did not take into account safety improvements that were 
union-backed and eventually required at all airlines, regardless of unionization. Due to 
the large sample size of the small population the difference in safety rate means could be 






Aviation is a high-risk industry, with potentially disastrous safety consequences 
for employees, companies, and the public.  As representatives of the front line employees 
of an airline, pilot and flight attendant labor unions are heavily invested in creating the 
safest airlines possible. While every airline labor union claims to work towards safety, 
the actual effect of a union on airline operations is unproven. Safety in airlines is 
achieved through several different methods, each of which work together to foster safety 
in the industry. The most common methods to increase safety include regulation, the 
efforts of individual airlines, and the efforts of labor unions. The purpose of this thesis is 
to determine the relationship between safety and unionization in US airlines, and to 
quantify the effect, if any, that labor unions have on safety.  
The 2009 Colgan Air crash in New York prompted nationwide outrage over the 
conduct of smaller regional airlines (Wald, 2009), and resulted in regulation reforms for 
Part 121 commercial air carriers.  (Dorr & Duquette, 2013). The effects of these changes 
are yet to be fully realized; there is concern that they may be too restrictive and harm the 
industry's ability to recruit the new pilots desperately needed for the increase in air travel 
(Thurber, 2013), though the regulation may result in fewer safety errors.  
 Regulation is, of course, not the only way to increase safety in the airlines. 
Particularly in industries with large barriers to entry (such as aviation), management is 
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concerned with keeping expensive equipment in good working condition. Alaska Airlines 
recently debuted a “Ready, Safe, Go!” campaign, focusing on a company-wide dedication 
to safety (Prnewswire.com, 2014). But airlines controlled by boards and other stake 
holders may focus on short term financial savings, and not adequately take the rare but 
extreme costs of a safety error into consideration. Indeed, several studies have shown that 
the myopic views of financially insecure airlines lead to an underinvestment in safety 
(Noronha & Singal, 2004, and Deppe, Hansen & Swearingen, 2012). This shortcoming 
leaves the public and airline employees open to long term safety vulnerabilities. Known 
as a “tombstone technology” (Schiavo, 1997), changes in the aviation industry, 
particularly expensive changes, often require a large number of deaths before safety 
innovations become industry standards.  
As representatives of front line workers, airline labor unions have long held that 
safety is one of their biggest priorities; for example, the largest pilots’ union, the Air Line 
Pilots Association (ALPA), has the motto “Schedule with Safety” (n.d). The American 
Airlines pilots union, Allied Pilots Association (APA), has a promise that 20% of its 
members' dues go to “support aviation safety” (n.d.). And the Association of Flight 
Attendants (AFA) call themselves “Aviation's First Responders” (n.d.), an 
acknowledgment of the front line work that flight attendants do for aviation safety.  
 Since the late 1960s, however, the American workforce has seen a decline of 
unionization. In 1967, overall American worker participation in unions was 
approximately 28%; in 2011, it was only 12% and falling (Madland, Walter, & Bunker, 
2011). If the unions are as good for safety as they claim to be, safety in the airlines could 
be compromised by decreasing unionization. If, however, the actual effect of unions on 
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safety is negligible, or even negative, then at least from a safety viewpoint the decrease 
may be nothing for which to be concerned. Therefore, determining the relationship 
between unions and airline safety could have a dramatic impact upon how the aviation 
industry and the public as a whole view labor unions in commercial airlines.  
 No studies were found that attempted to determine the direct impact that labor 
unions have on safety in the aviation industry. In other industries, such as retail, coal 
mining, and construction, studies (Sinclair, Martin, & Sears, 2010, Gillin, Baltz, Gassel, 
Kirsch, Vaccaro, 2002, and Morantz, 2012) have confirmed that safety culture and safety 
outcomes are both improved in unionized workplaces. Noronha & Singal, (2004) 
concluded that companies in poor financial health, possibly as an unintended 
consequence of union-affected reasons such as high wages or strict working rules, may 
have an increase in safety error instances as a result of less investment in safety programs 
or maintenance. Rose (1989) determined that a 9.92% decrease in operating margin 
results in a 5% increase in total accident rate. But a later study by Raghavan (2012) 
showed that even poor financial health may not be an indication of safety investment by 
an airline.  
 This study proposes to determine if there is a labor union effect on safety in the 
commercial airline industry by comparing accident and incident rates to the extent of 
unionization in a company. This difference in mean safety rate between unionized and 
non-unionized airlines is the “Union Effect,” that is, the measurable effect that a union 






 Support for the positive, neutral, or negative link between safety and commercial 
airline unionization has not been well researched. However, in other industries, such as 
retail, coal mining, and construction, research has been done in an attempt to understand 
the connections between unionization and safety outcomes. A study by Sinclair, Martin, 
and Sears (2010) determined that union status had a significant positive correlation with 
the perception of job safety and a good safety culture in the retail industry. The authors 
indicated an implication of the study is that it is important for managers to alert workers 
to dangerous situations more effectively, and to practice better safety habits. An 
alternative implication, however, could be that unions are currently more effective than 
traditional manager-employee relations at disseminating safety information and nurturing 
a positive safety culture. A study by Morantz (2012) showed a positive relationship 
between unionization and safety in coal mines. Although unionization predicts higher 
total and non-traumatic injuries, it is also true that unionization predicts a substantial and 
significant decline in traumatic injuries and fatalities. Morantz hypothesizes that these 
seemingly contradictory findings indicate not only an increase in safety for unionized 
coal miners, but that reporting of non-traumatic injuries increases in unionized 
workplaces. These findings concur with the other studies in this research indicating 
higher incident reporting and a greater awareness of safety culture in unionized 
workplaces.  
 Gillin, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, and Vaccaro (2002) found there was a positive 
correlation between unionization and safety in the construction industry.  Unionized 
employees were significantly more likely to feel supported by their peers and superiors, 
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to be made aware of dangerous situations, to have more safety meetings, and to perceive 
that risk taking was not a part of their job. This last point has particularly important 
implications for aviation, as a risk-taker in an aircraft could easily kill hundreds of 
passengers and innocents on the ground. Risk-taking is not encouraged in the 
standardized commercial aviation industry, and a risky pilot is a liability in the strictly 
controlled cockpit.  
 One problem identified by Morantz in the 2009 meta-analysis is that few, if any, 
studies attempted to determine which union activities were the ones that had an effect on 
safety. Beneficial activities may be supported by management or unions in some 
companies but not in others, which presents confounding variable. It is possible that a 
program supported by unions in one company or industry would have a similar program 
supported by management in another company or industry. This possible confounding 
variable is of some concern to a search for the “union effect” specifically in airlines. 
 
Financial Resources and Safety Spending 
 Finite resources are available to an airline. Revenue varies greatly in the aviation 
industry, due to fluctuating fuel prices and unstable (if not entirely unpredictable) trends 
in consumer purchases. In recent years, fuel has accounted for an average of 23% of the 
cost of operating a US commercial airline, and labor costs another 28%, representing the 
two largest expenditures of an airline (Airlines.org, n.d.). Some of the variation is passed 
directly to the customer in increasingly common fuel surcharges (Martin, 2012), helping 
airlines to offset unplanned cost increases. Labor costs, on the other hand, are 
infrequently negotiated and do not directly rely on the airline's short term ability to pay. 
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Therefore, maintenance programs and safety investments are areas in which the higher 
wages negotiated by the labor unions, and their net effect on airlines, may hurt airline 
safety.  
A study by Deppe, Hansen, and Swearingen (2012) found a positive relationship 
between the level of maintenance expenditures and financial distress for financially weak 
companies. However, “an inverse relationship between maintenance expenditures and 
financial distress was found to exist for financially strong companies....given that 
maintenance cost is a measure of safety, the results provide evidence of myopic behavior 
in the deregulated period and an erosion of safety between the regulated and deregulated 
periods (pg. 17)”  Overall, this study finds that airlines have become less safe as a result 
of deregulation, effects of which include lower salaries for workers and lower ticket 
prices for travelers. But a 1989 study by Morrison and Winston found that as a result of 
deregulation, and thus the increased cost cutting competition between airlines, airline 
safety has not been significantly compromised.  Deregulation occurred in 1978, around 
the same time as the decline in unionization (Moore, 1986), and was possibly a factor in 
the decrease of safety found in the Deppe, Hansen, and Swearingen study.  
 In 2004, Noronha and Singal found that a whole letter difference in bond rating of 
an air carrier affected the likelihood of that carrier having a safety error by 10%. 
Companies with higher bond ratings, a measure of financial health and security, were 
significantly less likely to have a “safety mishap.” A study conducted by Raghavan in 
2012, however, found that there is little relation between the financial health of a 
company and its spending on maintenance. One of the criticisms of the Noronha and 
Singal study, which was mentioned in the study itself, is that operating margin and 
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profitability, the two measures used by the study, are historical trends. The investment in 
safety, however, is a forward-looking prediction of future payoffs and requirements that 
are affected by, but also largely independent from historical trends. By looking at the 
Altman-Z score of a company, the measure of the likelihood of bankruptcy in the next 
two years, Raghavan’s study determined how financially healthy airline companies were. 
Raghavan then used spending on maintenance as a useful metric for determining safety, 
much as the Deppe, Hansen, and Swearingen study. Raghavan’s study found that, despite 
there being a non-significant negative relationship between financial health and spending 
on safety, “airlines in poor financial health do not compromise on safety.” (pg. 256) 
Therefore, although airlines may have limited resources to spread between safety 
spending and potentially higher union-negotiated labor wages, safety may not 
significantly affected by such labor contracts.  
Gittell, Von Nordenflycht, and Kochan (2004) conducted a study that brings the 
financial costs of the union-airline relationship on safety one step further. Their mixed 
methods study showed that the nature of the relationship between employees and 
management was more important to the financial health of an airline than the structure of 
the relationship. The structure may or may not include union presence. Unions that assist 
in a positive relationship between the company and the employees also help create 
financially sound airlines. On the other end of the spectrum, airlines with poor employee 
relations, with or without unions, are going to have a lower likelihood of long-term 





Union Activities to Increase Safety 
 One of the key ways in which unions attempt to increase safety in airlines is 
through regulation.  For example, ALPA, the largest airline pilot union in the U.S., 
supported H.R. 182, a bill designed to limit the duty time for pilots regardless of the type 
of operations they fly (Air Line Pilots Associations, n.d.).. Fatigue is a very dangerous 
condition to fly under (Reason, 1997) as human factors, the interaction between people 
and machine, have contributed to nearly 80% of all aviation safety errors. Therefore any 
successful attempt at limiting fatigue would help to increase safety, which airline unions 
recognize and work for. Other regulation changes ALPA and other unions included 
having seatbelt signs in commercial cabins, and installing TCAS (Traffic Collision 
Avoidance System) in every cockpit. These and other union lobbying efforts at regulation 
of the aviation industry have helped to increase safety through the entire industry. 
Other union attempts at improving safety are through litigation rather than 
regulation. The Teamsters Local 1224 (Airline Professionals Association, n.d.) is a union 
representing pilots from eleven regional airlines from around the country. It recently filed 
a lawsuit against ABX Air on behalf of a represented captain, who had been terminated 
for “exercising his FAA-mandated authority to ensure safe flight operations and his 
refusal to operate the aircraft in a manner that was prohibited by FAA-approved aircraft 
procedures (Airline Professionals Association, n.d.).” The captain had “identified safety 
concerns” while operating in Japan, and requested changes to the flight plan. He was 
fired, allegedly for the economic inconvenience, and his dismissal was announced to all 
the crew members at ABX Air. The union determined that the announcement created fear 
of reprisal for other captains who might attempt to operate their aircraft in a safer but less 
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economic way. The Teamsters filed suit not only to protect the individual captain, but to 
secure every captain’s right to operate their aircraft in a manner they deem fit for every 
pilot at ABX Air.  While the effect of an accident that does not occur is extremely 
difficult to determine, ensuring that pilots are able to amend or cancel a flight plan for 
safety reasons is paramount to good airline safety.  
 Educating members is another way that unions seek to increase safety for their 
members, which consequently increases safety for the entire airline and air travel 
industry. Information campaigns are popular methods for unions to improve workplace 
conditions at airlines. ALPA produced an informative and easy-to-read brochure titled 
“The Airline Pilots Guide to Fighting Fatigue” that was inserted into the Air Line Pilot 
magazine mailed to union members (Wykoff, Kay, Kilmer, Nordengen & Gauthier, 
2008). This brochure, which is also available online in PDF format, contains the 
definition and causes of fatigue, how to spot fatigue in oneself and others, and strategies 
to try to mitigate the effects of fatigue. While pilots are exposed to this information from 
many sources throughout their careers, reminders and reinforcement increase the 
effectiveness of their knowledge. The Association of Flight Attendants has a “Latest 
News” segment on their website that includes videos and articles to remind flight 
attendants of the safest procedures and other safety upgrades the AFA has secured 
(AFA.org, n.d.). 
 There is, of course, plenty of incentive and opportunity for organizations to 
provide information of all sorts to their employees. Unions, however, may be able to 
reach members of organizations that are too small to devote many resources to informing 
employees of best practices or potential workplace hazards. And they may be more 
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effective at promoting safety practices that are labor or resource intensive and therefore 
may not be promoted by the airline.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
 As previously discussed, this study found limited research done to determine if 
there is a difference between airlines with or without a labor union and that airline’s 
safety record. The meta-analysis by Morantz published in 2009 indicated a need to 
identify the empirical relationship between safety and unions.  Morantz identified that 
many unions use a safety emphasis to create the impression that they are beneficial not 
just to their individual members, but to the group and industry as a whole. Research 
supporting this, however, appears to be absent. In the face of declining union 
membership, determining the truth of the union impact on safety could have enormous 
implications for the safety and public confidence in air travel. Therefore, the purpose of 
this study is to test the effect of labor unions on safety as it relates to the commercial 
airline industry. The independent variable is defined as the safety rate (the total number 
of accidents and incidents divided by the total number of departures) between 1990 and 
2013, including accidents that result in deaths or major aircraft losses, and incidences that 
result in injuries or minor aircraft damage. The dependent variable is the extent of 
unionization, if any, at the airline. Unionization includes both pilot and flight attendant 
workgroups, who have been unionized for all or part of the time between 1990 and 2013, 






 To guide the tests, the research question is: 
Is there a difference in safety rates of unionized and non unionized U.S. commercial 
airlines? 
 To further clarify the relationship, a sub-question was also asked: 
Is the safety rate difference affected by the severity of loss of safety (accidents versus 
incidents)? 
 By answering these questions, this study determined if labor unions affect the 
safety rate of an airline as compared to non-unionized airlines. If a positive union effect 
can be found, the decrease in unionization should be considered a problem for future 
safety in the airlines. If a negative correlation is found, the usefulness of unions may still 






METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
Introduction 
 In order to determine the relationship between labor unions and safety in the US 
airlines, a quantitative study was conducted. This study used public data available online 
on airline safety errors and the extent of unionization. The data collected was used for a 
statistical test to determine the “union effect” on safety.  
 
Participants 
 The participants in this study were commercial airlines that operate mostly or 
wholly within the United States of America. These airlines were identified through the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) website as being US-based and certified for 
operations in the United States National Airspace. The constantly merging and changing 
nature of the airline industry creates a possible confounding variable for finding the 
“union effect,” and complicated this study. While major airlines maintain a stable 
presence in the industry throughout years and decades, regional airlines create a shifting 
landscape of unionization and cultures, through creation, mergers, and bankruptcies. 
Other times, the regional airline flies on behalf of multiple major carriers, such as 
SkyWest's operations for United, Delta, Alaska, American Eagle, and US Airways 
(Customer service plan, n.d.). Because of the difficulty of determining the impact of these 
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mergers on the employees and their unionization, each airline was considered on its own 
when it exists as an individual company, regardless of past or future unionization and 
mergers. In the case of regional airlines with strong ties or outright ownership by a major 
airline, any incidences or accidents were considered for the record of the regional airline 
alone, and did not reflect on the incident/accident rate of the major airline. This ensured 
that the unionization of each airline was considered for its own incident/accident rate, and 
gave a more accurate “union effect.” For example, non-unionized SkyWest's 
incident/accident rate did not affect the unionized Alaska Airline's incident/accident rate, 
even though many Alaska Airlines flights are operated by SkyWest (Customer Service 
Plan, n.d.). Airlines that operated for at least 15 years since 1990, had an average of at 
least 130,000 departures per year, and had data available through the National 
Transportation Safety Board and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics were considered 
for this study. 
 Due to the nature of this study, approval from the Institutional Review Board at 
the University of North Dakota was not required as there was no data collection 
pertaining to individuals. 
 
Data Collection 
 The methods design for this project consisted of a collection of existing data. All 
the required information was a matter of public record. Accidents and incidents are 
required by federal law to be reported to the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB). Airlines were identified through the FAA website. Unionization statistics were 
available through individual union websites and individual airline websites.  
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Incidents and Accidents 
 Accidents and incidents have specific definitions according to the NTSB and are 
laid out in a 1994 document on the Investigation Process Research Resource Site. 
Essentially, an accident is a loss of safety where a fatal or major injury happens to a 
person or aircraft, including engine damage or hull loss. An incident is defined as “an 
occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which 
affects or could affect the safety of operation” (Investigation Process Research Resource 
Site, 1994).   
 These levels of safety measurement are set by industry and legal professionals, 
who have had years to develop exact criteria for safety errors. This ensures that, while 
each accident is unique, similar results are grouped together, making for a more accurate 
comparison. Using the same levels as the NTSB and FAA also enables the researcher to 
access records and evaluate safety errors for the appropriateness of including them in the 
tests. 
 As with unionization, incidents and accidents were measured in different ways for 
different tests. The total number of accidents and incidents between 1990 and 2013 was 
determined for each airline. The number of incidents, accidents, and incidents/accidents 
combined were then be divided by the total departures between 1990 and 2013 of each 
airline, creating an accident, incident, and total safety error rate that could be fairly 
compared across different airlines. Though reporting safety rates in terms of hours or 
miles flown is common, comparing safety rates by number of departures is a good metric 
because the most dangerous and incident/accident prone portions of a flight are take-off 
and landing (Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airline Operations, Worldwide 
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operations 1959-2014, 2014, pg. 20). Both take-off and landing happen only once per 
flight, regardless of the total number of hours flown. In the same eight hours, a major 
airline might only fly between a single city pair, while a regional airline could complete 
up to six different legs. So while they might be flying for the same amount of time, a 
major and a regional airline have a very different number of opportunities for having an 
incident or accident for a similar number of hours of operation. At the same time, a major 
airline might have thousands of operations a day, to a regional airline's dozens or 
hundreds of operations. By creating an accident/incident rate that takes both these 
concerns into consideration, very different airlines can be more accurately compared. 
Aircraft manufacturer Boeing also measures losses per million departures, recognizing 
that not all flight hours carry the same probability for damage (Statistical Summary of 
Commercial Jet Airline Operations, Worldwide operations 1959-2014, 2014). 
 A separate test was run for each rate to determine if there is a difference in safety 
rate for unionized and non-unionized airlines for only incidents, only accidents, or on the 
total rate of both accidents and incidents. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB.gov, n.d.) is the agency that 
investigates and collects records of aviation accidents and incidents. These records are 
public information, and were gathered online for this study. The database was filtered for 
operations within the United States by US Commercial carriers operating under Part 121 
(Air Carrier) certifications. 2032 records met the search criteria, though only the larger 
passenger airlines were included in the study. 330 cases, including accidents and 
incidents were included.  
15 
 
Incidents and accidents that occurred outside of the United States were excluded 
from this study. There are simply too many confounding factors involved with such 
incidents, including language and cultural misunderstandings, varying safety standards 
between countries, and possible unfamiliarity with international procedures. The 
exclusion of these accidents makes comparing larger, international airlines and smaller, 
US-only airlines more equitable.  
 
Airlines 
The airlines included in the study were AirTran/ValuJet, Alaska, America West, 
American, Continental, Delta, Frontier, Horizon, JetBlue, Mesa, SkyWest, Southwest, 
United, and US Airways. Though large enough to be considered for the study, American 
Eagle/Envoy/Simmons Air has too convoluted a history to be reliably included in the 
study. The large number of mergers, rebranding, unionization and de-unionization create 
enough confounding factors to make any difference between safety rates for unionized 
and non-unionized unreliable. And though they were both large and consistent enough to 
be included in the study, the two airlines by the name ExpressJet were excluded. Since 
the accident reports didn’t specify which ExpressJet they accident report was for, there 





Table 1. Preliminary Sample of Annual Departures. Departure information is from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for example years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2013. 
The average of the sample years is included.  
  
Airline Name 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 Average Note 
Southwest 338,106 685220 903831 1029284 1114811 1124432 865947 A 
Delta 836530 878908 894470 644692 725151 759391 789857 A 
American 747040 679216 716528 666371 534179 530412 645624 A 
US Airways 1012767 768513 723548 418168 401964 411256 622702 A 
SkyWest    509613 589166 616956 571911 A 
United 617658 713031 735075 481182 340184 504231 565226 A 
Northwest 474697 509929 537803 478068   500124 A 
Envoy Air  200322 443083 516558 426046 425408 402283 B 
Continental 446215 426891 387551 295357 238888  358980 A 
ExpressJet (ev)  207868 220221 303573 314949 734866 356295 B 
ExpressJet (xe)  206430 300130 396013 379988  320640 B 
Trans World 274922 266977 263155    268351 C 
Eastern Air 261759      261759 C 
Endeavor Air    237858 254185 291298 261113 B 
Mesa  218002  312057 171713 142997 233924 A 
Comair   167759 370699 142587  227015 C 
America West 222001 191983 210083 195815   204971 A 
Westair 180873      180873 C 
Chautauqua     231283 167444 137952 178893 B 
AirTran  6539 101638 193628 246588 172934 144265 A 
Alaska  102537 133595 147535 159199 139258 156645 139794 A 
JetBlue   10134 110181 197979 240654 139737 A 
Independence    134339   134339 C 
Horizon Air 163465 197743 160363 155462 115922 105 132177 A 
Business Exp  131569     131569 C 
Piedmont    156472 115999 111357 127942 C 
Cape Air    115530 125362 117412 119435 C 
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Table 1 cont.         
Airline Name 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 Average Note 
PSA Airlines    113381 120391 115745 116886 C 
Air Wisconsin 87492 34200 113934 162389 156307 145886 116701 D 
Hageland Avit    78689 99616 113634 97313 D 
Trans States  133975 105119 139203 52579 54499 97075 D 
Colgan Air    86933 99216  93074 C 
Valujet   67617     67617 A/E 
Aloha Airlines 65449 68285 67739 56051   64381 D 
Hawaiian 71167 59036 64063 48919 68523 72686 64065 D 
Compass     55486 60975 58230 C/D 
Skyway    57646   57646 C/D 
Frontier   14502 37361 76252 80465 75490 56814 D 
 
Notes- 
A- Airline was included in the study. 
B- Airline was excluded from the study due to large numbers of confounding factors, 
including large numbers of mergers, name changes, divisions, acquisitions, or 
name duplications. 
C- Airline was excluded from the study due to too short a history. 
D- Airline was excluded from the study due to being too small in size. 
E- ValueJet was included in the study even though it operated for only a few years 
because it was a direct predecessor to AirTran 
 
Departure Records 
The number of operations used in the safety rate for each carrier was collected 
through the Research and Innovative Technology Administration's Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics website. This is public information. Departures Performed totals 
were available for most major carriers, by year, beginning in 1990 through 2013. Take-
off and landing are the most dangerous phases of flight (Statistical Summary of 
Commercial Jet Airline Operations, 2014) and where an accident or incident is most 
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likely to occur. Therefore, departures performed was used in this study, as a measure of 
individual flights performed, to determine a carrier's safety rate. Some air carriers did not 
have reports for departures performed for years they were in service, and so any accidents 
or incident report during those years were removed from the study. Atlantic Southeast, a 
relatively large and stable airline operating for most of the years between 1990 and 2013, 
was excluded because no departure figures were listed. 
 
Unionization 
The largest pilot's union, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA, n.d.) website 
supplied the majority of unionization data for pilots. Other pilot unions’ websites, 
including the Transportation Worker's Union (TWU.org, n.d.), the Teamsters 
(teamsterair.org, n.d.) , Southwest Airline Pilot's Association (TWU.org, n.d.), Frontier 
Pilots Association (TWU.org. n.d.), and the Allied Pilot's Association (Alliedpilots.org, 
n.d.), supplied information about unionization for non-ALPA pilots.  
The Association of Flight Attendants (AFA.org, n.d.) represents the majority of 
unionized flight attendants at the airlines included in the study. AFA membership 
information was supplied through emails with a representative. Membership information 
for non-AFA unionized flight attendant workforces came from websites for the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM.org, n.d.), 
Transport Workers Union (TWU.org, n.d.), and the Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants (APFA.org, n.d.). 
 Airlines were grouped according to how long they have been unionized. Group 1 
was airlines that have been continuously unionized during their operations between 1990 
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and 2013. These airlines were Air Tran, Alaska, American, Continental, Horizon, 
Northwest, Southwest, United, and US Airways. Group 2 was airlines that were not 
unionized, or that became unionized partway through their operations between 1990 and 
2013. These airlines were America West, Delta, JetBlue, Mesa, SkyWest, and ValuJet. 
The same tests were run with each group to determine if a statistically significant 
difference could be found between different levels of unionization and safety. 
 
Statistical Tests 
 The dependent variable in this test was the unionization of airlines, measured as 
previously described. The independent variable was the number of safety incidences and 
accidents, also measured as previously specified. A t-test was used to determine if there 
was a difference between the mean of the safety rate of Group 1 (airlines with long 
standing unionization), and the mean of the safety rate of Group 2 (recently or non-
unionized airlines). Several tests were run to determine if the difference between safety 






Table 2. Airlines Included in the Study. With the total number of departures (Deps ’90-
’13), the total number of incidents (Incdnts), the incident safety rate (Inc Rate), the total 
number of accidents (Accdnts), the accident safety rate (Acc Rate), the total accidents 
plus incidents (Acc+Inc), and the accident plus incident safety rate (Acc+Inc Rate). 
Sorted into airlines with longstanding unionization (Group 1), or the recently or non-
unionized airlines (Group 2). 
 
Airline Name Deps '90-'13  Incdnts Inc Rate Accdnts Acc Rate Acc+Inc Acc+Inc Rate 
Longstanding Unionization       
AirTran 2,939,497 2 0.68 10 3.40 12 4.08 
American 15,998,872 44 2.75 79 4.94 123 7.67 
Alaska 3,399,254 22 6.47 10 2.94 32 9.41 
Continental 7,929,064 37 4.67 34 4.29 71 8.95 
Horizon 3,611,726 7 1.94 8 2.22 15 4.15 
Northwest 9,522,127 29 3.05 33 3.47 62 6.51 
Southwest 20,971,304 33 1.57 39 1.86 72 3.43 
United 13,906,968 68 4.89 68 4.89 136 9.78 
US Airways 14,320,979 32 2.23 37 2.58 69 4.82 
Non- or Recently Unionized        
America West 3,525,174 8 2.27 20 5.67 28 7.94 
Delta 18,189,7222 63 3.46 73 4.01 136 7.48 
Jet Blue 1,954,866 7 3.46 2 1.02 9 4.60 
Mesa 3.286,607 8 2.43 12 3.65 20 6.69 
SkyWest 6,056,247 11 1.82 10 1.65 21 3.47 
ValuJet 212,477 3 14.12 5 23.53 8 37.65 
 
All timeframes are 1990-2013 








There was no significant difference between the nine Group 1 airlines with either 
longstanding unionization (those unionized before 1990, or airlines formed after 1990 but 
unionized the same year), and the six Group 2 airlines recently unionized or not 
unionized.  
For the accident rate (number of accidents per million departures), there appeared 
to be a difference between the airlines with longstanding unionization (M= 3.36, SD= 
1.13, N=9) and the recently or non-unionized airlines (M= 6.56, SD= 8.51, N=6, 
t(5.117)= -.916, p>.05, two-tailed) with the unionized airlines appearing safer, though the 
difference was not significant. For the incident rate (number of incidents per million 
departures), there also appeared to be a difference between the airlines with longstanding 
unionization (M= 3.14, SD= 1.85, N=9) and airlines that were recently unionized or non-
Unionized (M= 4.59, SD= 4.73, N=6, t(13)= -.829, p>.05, two-way). Again the unionized 
airlines appeared to have fewer incidences than the recently or non-unionized airlines, 
though the difference was still not significant. 
The largest difference between safety means was in the total safety rate (accidents 
+ incidents per million departures). The difference was still not found to be significant, 
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however, between airlines with longstanding unionization (M= 6.54, SD= 2.51, N=9) and 
recently or non-unionized airlines (M= 11.31, SD= 13.02, N=6, t(5.248)= -.886, p>.05).  
 
ANOVA 
No significance was found with a one-way independent ANOVA between airlines 
that were unionized between 1990 and 2013, and airlines that were not unionized.  
Accident Rate- F(1, 13)= 2.146, p> .05. Incident Rate-F(1, 13)= 3.066, p>.05. Total 






Discussion of Findings 
 Previous research in other industries indicates that labor unions have a distinct 
positive effect on workplace safety. In some industries such as coal mining, this effect is 
significant enough to play a role in outcomes between different workplaces in the same 
industry. In other industries such as construction, labor unions played a significant role in 
the safety culture at different workplaces, including making workers feel more supported 
and less likely to take risky actions. The history of unionization in the airlines indicates 
that all unions consider themselves on the forefront of safety promotion, a claim that is 
supported by slogans and actions at all of the major airline unions. Airline labor unions 
have fought to increase on the job safety for their members through litigation, supporting 
regulations, and member education. Labor unions were instrumentals in pushing for the 
adoption of safety measures such as TCAS and the anti-fatigue rest rules of FAR117. 
Through education labor unions attempted to decrease threats from terrorists and fatigue. 
Union sponsored litigation ensured that individual pilots and flight attendants were able 
to fulfil their safety-focused job functions without fear of reprisal. Therefore, it was 
surprising that labor unions were not found in this study to have a distinct positive effect 
on safety rates of unionized or non-unionized airlines. There may be several reasons for 
this unexpected finding, including limitations of the t-test in a small population, many 
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confounding factors of the industry, and the number of smaller airlines that were 
excluded from this study.  
 
Limitations of the t-test 
The t-test didn't find any significant differences between the safety rate means of 
the unionized and recently or non-unionized airlines. The t-test, though, is designed to 
take a small sample of a large population. The airlines included in this study, on the other 
hand, were a small population from which this study took a large sample. Of the largest, 
most established airlines (those with over 130,000 average departures and operating most 
of the years between 1990 and 2013), only three were excluded because of overly 
complicated or missing data. Therefore, though the t-test didn't find a significant 
difference, it could be surmised from the mean safety rates alone (total safety error rate of 
6.54 incidents and accidents per million departures) for longstanding unionized airlines, 
versus 11.31 accidents and incidents per million departures for recently or non-unionized 




The aviation industry is very complex. Despite the exceptionally high barriers to 
entry, such as the highly skilled and regulated workforces, million dollar aircraft, and 
gate spaces in airports, or perhaps because of them, airlines are constantly entering and 
exiting the industry, or merging and dividing amongst themselves. Since Deregulation in 
1978, airlines have been in especially fierce competition, adjusting investments in safety 
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and their labor groups as the industry fluctuates (Morrison and Winston, 1989). The 
workforce is also constantly changing; at many regional airlines, it is expected that most 
pilots will move up to a larger airline as quickly as they can, staying at the regional 
airlines perhaps a decade or less of their career (Zillman, 2014). At major airlines, pilots 
may only be able to work for a short amount of time due to mandatory retirement at age 
65, or other career-limiting factors. The short term nature of the workforce can mean that 
a positive safety culture can be harder to build at the regional airlines. 
Unionization is a long and difficult process, and requires an engaged workforce 
with a long enough memory to be willing to organize (ALPA.org, n.d.). Because of this, 
unionization is less likely to find favorable ground in the smaller, regional airlines where 
turnover is high. These airlines also have smaller salaries for their workforce (Aviation 
Sciences, n.d.), which drastically limits the possible dues amount and curtails any 
potential unions' finances. Less well known airlines may also be more willing to risk their 
reputations with unethical maneuvers or outright illegal union busting activities than a 
large carrier concerned with their public image. These same airlines are more likely to 
employ a less experienced workforce (Zillman, 2014), possibly follow less stringent 
maintenance schedules, or favor economics over safety. All these issues could lead to a 
high level of correlation between high accident/incident rates, regardless of unionization 
of the airline. Future studies that include these smaller airlines would be more 
comprehensive and might have a different outcome.  
Another confounding factor is the extreme range of causes of accidents and 
incidents in the airlines. Some accidents are attributed directly to a failure of the airline; 
ValuJet's 1996 crash into the Everglades killing everyone on board is attributed partly to 
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improper loading procedures of hazardous material, and the lack of recommended fire 
detectors in the cargo hold (NTSB, 1998). But other accidents that appear in this study 
are less the fault of the airline, such as American and United's involvement in the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. In other areas, fault can be much more difficult to assign. Bird strikes 
and turbulence are common causes of inflight incidents. These are seemingly random 
“acts of God” that happen at any airline, though they may be more or less prevalent 
depending on a particular airline's routes. An airline with a good safety culture, however, 
may be more proactive in routing to avoid known bird areas, or have better turbulence 
procedures in place (Customer Experience Featured Article, 2014).  Therefore these 
accidents and incidents have been included in the study, as they may be indicative of a 
failure of safety culture, and to give a complete range of accidents and incidents.  
 
Labor Unions’ Safety Effect on Non-Unionized Airlines 
 Despite the fact that some airlines are not unionized, labor unions can have an 
effect on the entire airline industry. This is particularly true of safety efforts that may not 
be seen as cost effective, and not voluntarily implemented by airlines until they are 
required to do so. Safety efforts include the requirement of fire detection and suppression 
systems in cargo holds, putting TCAS units in all cockpits, and the creation of anti-
fatigue FAR 117 rest rules. These efforts were strongly backed by airline labor unions 
such as ALPA and the AFA, and often fought by airline lobbyists. When adopted, these 
safety-positive changes were required at all airlines, not just those that were unionized. 
This study, however, only looked at the mean safety rate difference between unionized 
and non-unionized airlines. Therefore, any effects that labor unions have on safety that 
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are required for the entire industry did not affect the outcome of this study. It cannot be 
concluded that labor unions have no effect on safety. It can only be shown that there was 
no significant difference in safety rates between unionized and non-unionized airlines. 
 
Recommendations for Further Study 
In order to get a safety rate that encompassed a large timeframe, airlines with a 
smaller number of average yearly departures, or with shorter histories were not included 
in this study. These airlines may tend to be less unionized, and may have a higher rate of 
safety incidents and accidents. In order to get a different understanding of the effect labor 
unions have on safety rates, a study that included these smaller airlines might be useful. 
Such a study would likely have to encompass a smaller timeframe and may be less likely 
to capture a true safety rate due to the infrequent occurrences of airline accidents and 
incidents.   
Unionization of mechanics, ground crew, and dispatchers was not examined for 
this study. This was due to the complicated nature of these labor groups, who may be 
contracted workers not under direct airline employment, or the employees may work for 
more than one airline depending on the operations any given airport. Each of these front 
line worker groups, however, can have a profound impact on safety, from planning to 
operations. Labor unionization’s effect on safety could be different if these groups were 
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